Transcript
Summary: The victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran's June 24, 2005 presidential runoff election against former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has shocked many Iranians as well as outsiders. Ahmadinejad's reputation as a pro-regime conservative has aroused fears that his presidency will see a domestic crackdown on political and social freedoms and possibly a new round of confrontation with the outside world. How realistic are those fears? The Saban Center's Shaul Bakhash and Iranian political analyst Hadi Semati gave their analyses of the election and the likely consequences in both domestic and foreign policy.
Ahmadinejad's Electoral Victory: Both speakers portrayed the new president as a conservative populist who had mobilized electoral support by attacking the dominance of Iran's socioeconomic elite. They also agreed that the Bush Administration's attempt to intervene in Iranian politics by condemning the elections had probably backfired. The high turnout numbers do not necessarily demonstrate that the regime is popular, but they do suggest that Iranians strongly support change from within.
The key element of Ahmadinejad's rise to power, Bakhash argued, has been his critique of entrenched social and economic interests in Iran. During the campaign, Ahmadinejad promised to challenge the dominant economic elite, open up opportunities for ordinary people, and root out corruption. His populist stance prompted many Iranians who had not voted in the first round to turn out to vote for him in the second—thus helping to explain the upset of his victory over former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, a man widely seen as the symbol of elite corruption.
According to Bakhash, Ahmadinejad's outsider image is not entirely false, despite his close links to the regime. He and his core supporters feel marginalized by trends over the past decade, especially Western-style political reform, economic and cultural liberalization, and the rise of Westernized technocrats into positions of authority. They resent not only the reform movement, but also their own conservative colleagues who they feel have compromised on key tenets of the revolution. For them, it is a mark of pride to refer to themselves as "fundamentalists"—which, in Persian, can also mean "people of principle."
Semati offered a similar analysis of the election. Ahmadinejad is a true believer—honest, pious, and not corrupt, with a reputation for quiet efficiency as mayor of Tehran. While the more sinister rumors about his past career in the Revolutionary Guards appear to be untrue, he is deeply committed to the Islamic Republic. Semati agreed that Ahmadinejad's vocal opposition to corruption (and Rafsanjani's so-called "oil mafia") played a key role in his victory. Ahmadinejad succeeded in mobilizing three key constituencies behind him: the rural masses, the urban poor, and religious conservatives. His victory shows that the use of neighborhood mosques and religious associations are still an effective means of political mobilization. The reform movement has retained the support of the educated middle class, but has failed to expand its appeal beyond this core constituency.
Overall, Semati said, the election showed that the tendencies of the Iranian electorate have not changed. Conservatives have the support of no more than 35 percent of the population, including a core conservative bloc of 15 percent or so. The majority still supports reform in general: perhaps 45-50 percent voted for changing the status quo in some way, while another 15 percent boycotted the election.
Meanwhile, the fundamental cleavages in Iranian politics and society—between state and society, between elites and masses, and among generations—also have not changed. While the socioeconomic elite may value political freedoms, the masses are exhausted with politics and care more about issues of economic security. The generation gap is more complex than is generally recognized, cutting not only across the public but also across the ruling elites. Ahmadinejad represents the new generation of conservatives, whose rise to power will be a defining feature of his presidency.
Domestic Policy: Both speakers agreed that the most significant changes of Ahmadinejad's presidency are likely to be in domestic policy. First and foremost, a populist approach to economic policy will be high on the new president's agenda. He has not articulated a clear economic program, Bakhash said, but his critique of the existing order points to certain policies: lower interest rates on bank loans to small borrowers, higher salaries for teachers and civil servants, greater access to the stock market for the "little man" and more generous state assistance for newlyweds and the poor. Semati agreed with this general assessment, predicting a shift towards economic statism, redistributive justice, and social spending under the new president.
Another more significant change may take place in the personnel of the Iranian government. Given the president's opposition to elite domination, Bakhash said, there are likely to be extensive changes at the sub-ministerial level as the new president seeks to shake up Iran's technocratic establishment. Similarly, Semati predicted that the Ahmadinejad presidency would reinforce the rise of a new class of conservative technocrats, committed to the Islamic Revolution yet comfortable with the requirements of running a modern state.
Both speakers also agreed, however, that Ahmadinejad's image as a conservative hardliner needs to be qualified. He does not place much importance on political freedoms; for him, the main issues are economic freedom and opportunity. Yet both Bakhash and Semati agreed that he was unlikely to attempt a major rollback of the social liberalization that has taken place in recent years. During the campaign he rejected the idea of trying to clamp down on freedoms for women and the young. In some respects, Semati said, Ahmadinejad was willing to concede even more than the reformists were. Both speakers therefore expected his government to impose some conservative restrictions on social freedoms, but only at the margins; a large-scale crackdown is unlikely.
How likely is Ahmadinejad to succeed in his domestic program? His campaign against corruption is likely to run into opposition from powerful regime interests, unless he is able to enlist the support of Khamene'i himself. As for the economy, Semati argued that the regime may be able to fill the state-society gap with populist economic policies in the short term. In the long term, Ahmadinejad's approach offers no structural solutions to Iran's real economic problems and is unlikely to stave off an eventual crisis—but in the meantime, it may be possible for him to allay popular unrest and buy more time for the regime.
Foreign Policy and the Nuclear Issue: In foreign policy, both Bakhash and Semati said, there is reason to expect fewer significant changes than in domestic policy. Ahmedinejad has spoken about the need for Iran to grow closer with "the East," especially China. He will probably not seek a rapprochement with the United States, and he will want to appear firm in his dealing with the Europeans. Nonetheless, it is still the supreme leader, not the president, who directs the overall thrust of Iranian foreign policy—especially since Ahmadinejad is a newcomer and will therefore be particularly dependent on Khamene'i for guidance.
The main worry, according to Semati, is that a combination of inexperience and overconfidence could lead the new president down a path of risk-taking and brinksmanship. The Bush Administration's rhetoric, condemning the elections as a sham, suggests that there is dangerous potential for a new clash between Washington and Tehran. Likewise, Bakhash saw the potential for conflict if Ahmadinejad's election leads Khamene'i to believe that there is public support for a more hard-line position. However, it is most likely that the supreme leader's continued control over Iranian foreign policy will ensure more continuity than change. Iran's opposition to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is already deeply engrained, for example, as is its policy on the nuclear program.
There is little doubt that Ahmadinejad favors a hard-line position on the nuclear issue; he has said that Iran does not need relations with the United States and should retain a full nuclear fuel-cycle capacity. Iran's stance on the nuclear program is long established and will not be easy to change no matter who is president. Nonetheless, participants in the discussion pointed out that Ahmadinejad's election represents a setback for the European strategy of engaging Iran. If Ahmadinejad does take a hard-line stance on the nuclear issue, the Europeans are likely to agree to take Iran before the U.N. Security Council. If, on the other hand, the Iranians show some flexibility but refuse to make fundamental concessions, the result will be a serious test of European resolve.
Given the uncertainty over the new president's true intentions, Bakhash said, a key indicator will be his appointments to government positions. In foreign policy, it will be instructive to see whether relative moderates such as Kamal Kharazi and Hasan Rowhani remain in their positions. If Ahmadinejad replaces such figures with people more in line with his own conservative background, that may be a sign that a shift to a more aggressive policy is in store.
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